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Abstract. Reputation mechanisms are a powerful tool to reduce the
potential risk of interacting with almost or completely unknown users in
environments in which there is no incentive to behave trustworthily, e.g.
in open and large-scale systems. However, by collecting feedback about
users, reputation mechanisms can easily be manipulated to deduce users’
profiles; thus, these mechanisms jeopardize users’ privacy, which clearly
compromise their wide adoption. Privacy-preserving reputation mecha-
nisms have recently been proposed to solve this issue. All the proposed
designs either rely on a trusted central authority to handle the casting
of votes and the derivation of reputation scores, or are based on a dis-
tributed environment and use cryptographic tools (e.g. non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and homomorphic encryption) to
demonstrate the validity of votes and reputation scores. However, to the
best of our knowledge, all the proposed distributed mechanisms produce
solely monotonic reputation scores: whatever the outcome of an interac-
tion, a service provider’s reputation can never decrease. In this article,
we propose a distributed privacy-preserving reputation mechanism han-
dling both positive and negative votes. This is achieved by combining
algorithms and tools from both the distributed and the cryptographic
communities.
Key words: Distributed reputation mechanism, privacy, non-monotonic
reputation score
1 Introduction
In large scale and dynamic networks such as the Internet, most interactions occur
between unknown users. When users invest time or money in such interactions,
this may induce a severe risk. For instance, in e-commerce transactions, a buyer
– or client – has no guarantee that the item on sale will be sent or even that
⋆ This work has been partially supported by the French ANR project AMORES,
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its real state is consistent with its description. Hence, there is a crucial need for
clients to determine to what extent an interaction with a given user is safe. In
the following, we call service providers the users that provide a given service,
and clients the users that wish to obtain a given service.
Reputation mechanisms come out as an effective tool to assess this risk, and
indirectly foster trust and motivate cooperation in large scale and open systems.
Indeed, similarly to the word-of-mouth reputation, a reputation mechanism al-
lows clients to form an opinion on the behavior of an unknown service provider
through a reputation score. A reputation score is a mathematical object (e.g. a
number or a percentage) computed from the set of votes cast by the past clients
of the targeted service provider. Reputation scores can either be computed by
a central entity – like in eBay4 – by the users themselves [2–5] or by the tar-
geted entity [6]. Users evaluate the risk of interacting with the targeted service
provider according to his reputation score. Reputation mechanisms are thus an
efficient tool to encourage service providers to trustworthily behave. On the other
hand, the reputation of misbehaving service providers gradually decreases, which
quickly dissuades potential clients from interacting.
In order to maintain reputation scores up to date, clients are regularly re-
quested to send their feedback regarding their past interactions with service
providers. Unfortunately, by collecting feedback from clients, reputation mech-
anisms can easily be manipulated to deduce users’ profiles (both clients’ and
service providers’) and thus to jeopardize their privacy. This is achieved by
compromising users’ anonymity and the unlinkability of their interactions [7].
Pfitzmann and Hansen’s taxonomy [8] states that a user is anonymous if an at-
tacker cannot identify him among a group of users; and that any two interactions
are unlinkable if an attacker cannot tell whether they involve the same users.
Privacy-preserving reputation mechanisms have recently been proposed to solve
this issue. Proposed designs either rely on a trusted central authority to handle
the vote casting and reputation score derivation [9], or use cryptographic tools
(e.g. non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and homomorphic en-
cryption) to demonstrate the validity of votes [6]. By protecting users’ identities
and by guaranteeing the unlinkability of their actions, Resnick et al. [10] have
shown that it gives supplementary incentives for the clients to feed the reputa-
tion mechanism with honest feedback without fearing retaliation. However, to
the best of our knowledge, none of the existing privacy-preserving reputation
mechanisms can handle both positive and negative votes. Note that a negative
vote is a vote reflecting a dissatisfied client, but not necessarily a negative vote in
the mathematical sense. Negative votes allow reputation scores to exactly reflect
misbehaving service providers. In particular, negative votes allow to protect the
system against service providers that initially behave correctly to gain a high
reputation, until they suddenly turn malicious and attract clients in fraudulent
transactions. Indeed, handling both positive and negative votes is recognized as
a real scientific challenge [6].
4 http://www.ebay.com
In this article, we present the main principles of a reputation mechanism
preserving the privacy of clients and service providers in a distributed way. This
mechanism is inspired from the signatures of reputation proposed by Bethen-
court et al. [6]. The most important feature of our proposal is the handling of
both positive and negative votes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
mechanism handling such a feature in a privacy-preserving distributed context.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We present the state
of the art of privacy-preserving reputation mechanisms in Sect. 2, with a focus
on the signatures of reputation of Bethencourt et al. [6]. In Sect. 3, we define
the privacy and security properties that our mechanism guarantees. We then
present the tools used in our proposal in Sect. 4, and how they are used during
an interaction between a client and a provider in Sect. 5. Finally, we conclude
in Sect. 6.
2 State of the Art
Pavlov, Rosenschein and Topol [11] were the first ones to propose a reputation
system guaranteeing the privacy of its users in a distributed way. In contrast
to subsequent works, their notion of privacy is limited to the non-disclosure of
clients’ votes. Androulaki et al. [9] go a step further by proposing a reputa-
tion mechanism preserving the anonymity of both service providers and clients
through pseudonyms, anonymous credentials and blind signatures. On the other
hand, and despite their reliance on a correct (but curious) central authority,
their mechanism does not guarantee that the reputation score of a given service
provider reflects its past behavior. Indeed, a service provider s1 can easily col-
lude with another one s2 by giving to s2 the repcoins (i.e. anonymous positive
votes) he has received so that s2 can ask the central authority to increase his
own reputation score with these irregularly received repcoins. Guaranteeing the
non transferability of reputation is crucial when dealing with malicious service
providers. In addition, and as mentioned above, negative votes are not handled
by this mechanism.
Bethencourt, Shi and Song [6] propose a cryptographic primitive called signa-
ture of reputation, allowing any user to advertise the services he provides with his
reputation without divulging any private information. Both clients and service
providers preserve their anonymity through one-time pseudonyms. The construc-
tion of signatures of reputation does not rely on any trusted central authority.
Rather, each service provider computes signatures of reputation based on cryp-
tographic votes built by his past clients. The reputation of a service provider is
the count of distinct clients who granted him votes. This avoids ballot-stuffing
attacks, i.e. attacks where a single client votes multiple times for a service provi-
der to raise or lower his reputation. Bethencourt et al.’s system makes extensive
use of Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZK) [12]. Basi-
cally, such proofs allow to prove the knowledge of an equation solution without
disclosing it. This allows both clients and service providers to prove statements
such as “this pseudonym is well-formed” or “this signature of reputation is valid”
without disclosing their identity. The first drawback of their solution is that
NIZKs require high computational power, bandwidth, and storage capacity. For
instance, a signature of reputation computed on 100 votes takes about 50MB
of storage, which is too large to be practical. The second issue is, as for all ex-
isting privacy-preserving reputation mechanisms, that reputation scores do not
reflect dissatisfied clients. This is a clear impediment to the wide adoption of
such privacy-preserving mechanisms. In the following, we propose a mechanism
that does take into account the discontentment of clients.
3 Modelization and Main Expectations of our Proposal
In this section, we first introduce the model and the terminology used throughout
this work. Then, we present the properties that fully characterize our privacy-
preserving reputation mechanism.
3.1 System Model
We consider a large scale and open system populated by clients and service
providers. We assume that both clients and service providers communicate over
an anonymous communication network, e.g. Tor [13]. Both clients and service
providers interact via pseudonyms they generate themselves. We do not make
any assumption regarding the behavior of both parties. In particular, clients
may abruptly end their interaction prior to having cast their votes, and service
providers may devise strategies to manipulate their own reputation, or steal the
reputation of another service provider. More generally, any number of users may
collude in the objective of breaking the anonymity of some other user.
3.2 Reputation Mechanism
First, we make a difference between a transaction and an interaction. A trans-
action represents the exchange of the service between a service provider and a
client, while an interaction consists of the transaction and all the communica-
tions between the client and the service provider allowing to take into account
the outcome of the transaction. Any meaningful reputation mechanism involves
the following three phases. The first phase allows any service provider to prove
its current reputation to any requesting client. Then, when the requirements of
both parties are satisfied, the transaction takes place. Finally, the client casts
a vote reflecting the quality of the transaction. Note that in order to face non-
cooperative clients, that is clients disengaging from the interaction prior to hav-
ing cast a vote, a mechanism attesting that a transaction did occur between both
parties need to be implemented. Such proofs of interaction must appear in the
reputation score of service providers.
3.3 Properties
We now present the properties that fully characterize our reputation mechanism.
Property 1 (Privacy of service providers). The privacy of service providers
is preserved if, when a client votes for an honest service provider, this service
provider is anonymous among the service providers with an equivalent reputation.
Property 2 (Privacy of clients). The privacy of clients is preserved if:
1. An honest client is anonymous among all clients;
2. The interactions of a client with different service providers are unlinkable.
In addition to both privacy properties, we present the properties that guar-
antee that no attacker can take advantage of our reputation mechanism.
Property 3 (Correctness of a reputation mechanism). A reputation mech-
anism is correct if the following six properties hold.
Unforgeability of votes If a service provider has received n votes, then
this service provider was involved in at least n transactions;
Unforgeability of interaction proofs If a service provider proves that n
transactions occurred, then this service provider was involved in at least
n transactions with distinct clients;
Unforgeability of reputation scores A service provider cannot prove a
fake reputation score;
Non-repudiation of votes If, at the end of a transaction between a client
and a service provider, the client casts a vote, then his vote updates the
reputation score that was proved at the beginning of the interaction;
Non-repudiation of interaction proofs At the end of a transaction be-
tween a client and a service provider, the service provider can prove that
the transaction occurred;
Impact limitation The impact of a single client on the reputation score of
a service provider is limited.
The unforgeability and non-repudiation properties are standard properties
in reputation systems, and most systems ensure them. On the other hand, the
non-repudiation of votes prevents colluding service providers from using a “good”
service provider to prove his reputation – and attract clients – and then behaving
maliciously and giving the negative votes to another service provider. Finally, the
impact limitation property prevents ballot-stuffing attacks. Note that Bethen-
court et al.’s signatures of reputation [6] guarantees those properties. However,
since there are no negative votes, service providers have no interest in repudiat-
ing a vote. In the following section, we present the tools we use to guarantee all
these properties.
4 Principles of our Mechanism
Our proposal aims at enhancing the signatures of reputation proposed by Bethen-
court et al. [6] by handling negative votes. Taking into account negative votes
implies major modifications with respect to the implementation of the mecha-
nism. Specifically, in Bethencourt et al.’s mechanism, service providers locally
store votes cast at the end of their interaction with their clients, and compute
their reputation score by aggregating the received votes. In particular, they can
keep only a subset of them, which clearly makes negative votes useless. We pro-
pose to improve upon this solution by guaranteeing that negative votes are taken
into account. This is achieved by making both reputation scores and votes of ser-
vice providers publicly available in order to prevent anyone from modifying or
hiding them. Our proposition accomplishes this without jeopardizing the privacy
of clients.
4.1 Preserving the Privacy
In order to preserve the privacy of both clients and providers (Prop. 1 and
2), these entities must prove that they belong to the system without revealing
their identity (in the following, we use the term credential as a synonymous
of identity), and prove the correctness of their computations without revealing
the values used in these computations. Similarly to Bethencourt et al. [6], we
use Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZK) to solve these
issues.
Furthermore, the reputation scores displayed by providers are approxima-
tions of their exact reputations. Indeed, if two different pseudonyms prove that
“82.476% of my clients are satisfied”, it is highly plausible that those pseudonyms
belong to the same provider, which breaks this service provider’s anonymity.
Thus, providers only prove approximations of their reputation score: showing
that “between 80% and 85% of my clients are satisfied” yields roughly the same
information as before, but enlarges the anonymity set of the provider.
4.2 Correctness of the Mechanism
Unforgeability of votes, interaction proofs and reputation scores. In
order to guarantee the properties of unforgeability (i.e. unforgeability of votes, in-
teraction proofs and reputation scores), we use anonymous proxy signatures [14].
They preserve the privacy of both clients and service providers due to their
compatibility with NIZKs. To participate in the system, each user (i.e. clients
and service providers) register with a registration authority which generates the
user’s credentials and certificates. With anonymous proxy signatures and NIZKs,
a user can then use his certificate to prove that he sent a message or made com-
putations without disclosing his credential among all registered clients, or service
providers. Several messages or computations can be linked to a unique hidden
certificate (using the same randomization of the certificate). By doing so, a client
can emit a vote for a service provider, without knowing the credential of the ser-
vice provider, but with the guarantee that his vote will affect the reputation
score of the service provider who proved his reputation at the beginning of the
interaction.
Non-repudiation of votes and interaction proofs. In the context of anony-
mous reputation mechanisms, both clients and service providers have antagonist
expectations. Clients require that each of their votes (in particular negative ones)
be taken into account, while providers expect their privacy to be preserved. How-
ever, if the provider remains anonymous when the client casts his vote, he has
the opportunity to reject a negative vote simply by not revealing his identity;
indeed, the vote cannot be assigned to any provider. On the other hand, if the
provider reveals his identity prior to the voting phase, his privacy is broken, and
the client may change both his behavior and his vote according to the provi-
der’s identity. In the same way, the provider wants to get a proof of interaction
testifying that a transaction took place, while the client wishes to stay fully
anonymous.
To deal with such opposite concerns, we propose to build a trusted and dis-
tributed third party through share carriers. At the beginning of each interaction
the client and the service provider choose share carriers among the system’s users
so that no one controls a majority of them, even if some of the share carriers can
be malicious. The role of share carriers is to obtain the identity of the service
provider, prior to the vote, and disclose this identity after the vote if the service
provider behaves incorrectly. The same process is used for the non-repudiation
of interaction proofs. The choice of share carriers is done at the beginning of
each interaction. This choice is jointly handled by both the client and the ser-
vice provider that wish to engage into a given transaction. This prevents any
collusions between a malicious client (or a malicious service provider) and a
set of malicious share carriers. The choice of share carriers is the outcome of a
nonce-based interactive protocol between the client and the service provider. To
prevent some of the share carriers from disclosing any sensitive information (i.e.
the identity of the provider, or the interaction proof), any information is shared
using Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) [15]. A VSS is a (t, n)-threshold crypto-
graphic scheme dividing a secret into n shares, such that any t shares allow any
user to recompute the secret. On the other hand, less than t shares yields no
information about it. Share carriers can also verify the consistency of all shares
and the correctness of the secret, so that they cannot be bilked by neither the
client nor the provider in the sharing process.
Impact limitation. To guarantee the impact limitation property, we follow
the strategy given by Bethencourt et al. [6] that allows to detect whether any
two votes on a given service provider were cast by the same client. This de-
tection is made through an indicator that fully characterizes a given couple
(client, provider), independently of the client and provider pseudonyms. Such an
indicator is called invariant. In Bethencourt et al.’s reputation mechanism, an
invariant is somehow a positive vote, and a service provider proves his reputation
score by proving that he obtained enough distinct invariants. In our construc-
tion, the invariant is used as an interaction proof, and appears in votes, to detect
multiple votes from the same client for the same provider. Note that even if the
invariant is unique for a given couple, it is impossible to compute the client’s
credential from the invariant and the service provider’s credential. Furthermore,
two providers cannot distinguish whether they have interacted with the same
clients or not.
In our scheme, the invariant is computed during a three steps interaction.
First, the provider masks his identity, and sends the result to the client. The
client then computes a masked invariant, based on the masked identity of the
provider and his own identity, and sends it to the provider. Finally, the provider
removes the mask, and obtains the plain invariant.
5 Protocol of interaction
In the previous section, we have presented the tools used to guarantee both the
privacy of providers and clients (Props. 1 and 2), and the mechanism’s correct-
ness (Prop. 3). We now detail the interaction protocol between a client c and a
service provider p, and describe how these tools are used. An interaction is made
of four successive stages.
1. Service provider p proves his reputation to client c.
2. Both c and p choose the distributed third-party for the interaction.
3. Both c and p commit themselves to the interaction by sharing a secret.
4. Once the transaction is over, they both participate to update p’s reputation;
there are three variants of this stage:
(a) both c and p are correct and help each other by respectively casting a
vote and getting a proof of interaction
(b) c is malicious and refuses to help p to get a proof of the interaction,
(c) p is malicious and refuses to help c to rate him.
We assume that, at the beginning of each interaction, p receives a certificate
on his credential and his reputation.
5.1 Proof of reputation
To prove his reputation, p sends his pseudonym nymp and his reputation repp
to c and proves that he knows a certificate on his reputation thanks to a NIZK.
Namely, p demonstrates that he knows
– credp such that nymp was issued from credp, and
– certp certifying 〈credp, repp〉
Once c has checked the proof and if he is comfortable with the reputation
score of p, then c engages an interaction with p. Note that all the proofs (i.e.
reputations and computations) are done through NIZKs.
5.2 Choosing the share carriers
Both c and p need to choose the share carriers they will rely on throughout
their interaction as presented in Section 4.2. The number n of chosen share
carriers depends on two system parameters – the total number N of user, and
the proportion m of malicious users – and on the maximal probability P of
having a collusion among the share carriers, that is of having more than n/2
malicious share carriers. Table 1 shows n for multiple values of N and m, for
P = 2−80.
Table 1. Required number of share carriers to prevent collusions as a function of N
(total number of share carriers) and m (percentage of malicious share carriers)
❍
❍
❍
❍❍
m
N
100 500 1,000 5,000 10,000
5% 9 45 53 61 61
6% 11 51 59 69 69
7% 13 55 67 75 77
8% 15 61 73 83 85
9% 17 67 79 93 93
10% 19 73 87 101 103
To choose the share carriers, both c and p use a hash function H (e.g. SHA-
256 [16]), with h-bits outputs, and proceed as follows.
1. c chooses a random nonce rc and commits himself to rc by sending H(00 ‖ rc)
to p;
2. p chooses a random nonce rp and sends it to c;
3. c sends rc to p;
The share carriers are the
{
⌊H(01 ‖ rp ‖ rc ‖ i)×N/2
h⌋, i ∈ {0, . . . , n′ − 1}
}
,
where all users are labelled 0, . . . , N − 1 and n′ is set so that the set contains
exactly n distinct share carriers.
5.3 Completion of a transaction
Once both client c and service provider p have agreed on the set of share carriers,
c must make sure that p will allow him to cast a vote whatever the issue of
the transaction. Similarly p must be guaranteed that c will allow him to get
a proof of interaction whatever the issue of the transaction. In both cases this
is achieved by having c and p commit to secrets, which they share among the
share carriers. From Sect. 4.2, computation of the invariant requires that both
c and p be involved in an interaction, we use it as the proof of interaction
between c and p. Thus, the secret of c is the masked invariant while the one
of p is its credential credp. Hence, even if either c or p disconnect after the
transaction, the other one will be able to reconstruct either p’s identity for c
or the invariant, that is the proof of interaction, for p. Once computed, p sends
his masked credential to c, c computes the masked invariant and both share
their secret among the share carriers. Suppose that client c wants to split a
secret x ∈ Zk into n shares and allows its reconstruction with any t of them.
Then, c randomly chooses aj ∈ Zk, j ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1}, defines a0 = x, and
q : z 7→
∑t−1
j=0 ajz
j . Client c sends the i-th share qi = q(i) to the i-th share
carrier. Client c also computes commitments Caj , Cqi to each aj and qi with
a homomorphic commitment scheme (such as the SXDH commitments [12]).
The main property of such commitments is that if Cz1 , Cz2 are commitments
to z1, z2 ∈ Z, then Cz1 · C
λ
z2
is a commitment to z1 + λz2. For each share, c
also computes two NIZKs: the first one is a proof that Cqi is a commitment to
qi. The second one is a proof that all the share are consistent, i.e. a proof that
Cqi ·
∏t−1
j=0(Caj )
−(ij) is a commitment to 0; indeed, thanks to the homomorphic
and commitment properties, this proof demonstrates that
qi =
t−1∑
j=0
aj (i
j) = q(i).
Once the secrets have been shared and verified, c and p can proceed with the
transaction. Figure 2 illustrates the interactions described in Sect. 5.2 and 5.3.
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. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Client Share carriers Service provider
Masked id
Computation of the
masked invariant
VSS of the masked invariant
VSS of the id
Verify shares
Shares verified Shares verified
Choice of the share carriers
Fig. 1. Preparation phase of the transaction between a client and a service provider
5.4 Casting a vote
Once both c and p have finished their transaction, the reputation of p can be
updated thanks to c’s vote (if any), or in the negative thanks to the proof of
interaction. There are three different outcomes of the protocol according to both
c and p behaviors, that is, depending on whether they are willing to give their
secrets.
Suppose that both behave correctly. Then c simply gives his vote and the
masked invariant to the share carriers, who transmit the masked invariant to
p. Note that sending the masked invariant to the share carriers save them from
recomputing it from their shares. Then, p reveals his credential to c and computes
the invariant. Afterwards, the vote is cast on p and p’s reputation is updated
with c’s vote.
Now assume that p refuses to reveal his credential. Then the share carriers
give p’s shares to c once c has cast his vote, allowing c to obtain p’s identity.
Thus, c is able to compute the invariant and to emit the vote.
Finally suppose that c refuses to give the masked invariant to p. Then whether
c has given his vote to the share carriers or not, the share carriers give c’s shares
to p, which allows p to compute the invariant and obtain the proof of interaction.
Figure 3 shows the vote emission when both c and p are correct.
.
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Client Share carriers Service provider
Vote computation
Vote + masked invariant masked invariant
id + invariant
Vote emission
Fig. 2. Vote emission
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have presented a reputation mechanism addressing two main
issues of reputation mechanisms: preserving all users’ privacy and computing
reputation scores based on both positive and negative ratings. There were already
systems addressing those two issues, but, to our knowledge, none addressed both
of them at the same time. We achieve this thanks to cryptographic schemes
such as zero-knowledge proofs, verifiable secret sharing, and anonymous proxy
signatures. Furthermore, our proposition is independent of the reputation model;
that is, our system can integrate any reputation model [2,5], preferably one using
both positive and negative ratings, and limiting the impact of a single client on
a given provider.
Our proposal works in a distributed fashion: no trusted central authority is
required for either the correctness or the users’ privacy. However, this requires
many certifications done by all the possible share carriers, which might be too
expensive for a large-scale system. For future work, we intend to quantify those
costs for an implementation. If they are too high, we will study to what extent
a central authority could lower these costs while preserving the users’ privacy.
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